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AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980 AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (21 Apr 69) FOR OT UT 691241

23 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field  
Force Vietnam Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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as

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY**  
**APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268**

AVFB-FAC

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, MOS CSFOR-65 (U)

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Administration/Personnel.

(1) During this period there were three significant personnel changes in II FFORCEV Artillery. Captain Barry L. Eiders assumed command of Headquarters Battery, Major Robert M. Dunning assumed the position of S1, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, and Major Richard L. Miller assumed command of HMB, 8th TAB, 25th Artillery.

(2) Personnel rotation has been normal for the period covered by this report, and replacements have been received in adequate numbers in the majority of MOS positions. However, MOS shortages continue in USC (Radio Teletype Operator), 723 (Communications Center Specialist), 71720 (Maintenance Data Specialist), 16F10 and 16F40 (Light Air Defense Artillery Crewman and key NCO's), 76S20 (Automatic Repair Parts Specialist), and 13A10 and 13B40 (Field Artillery Basic Crewman), as well as 17B20 (Counterbattery/Counter mortar Radar Crewman).

(3) The following awards were presented to assigned and attached personnel:

- (a) Silver Star - 2.
- (b) Soldier's Medal - 1.
- (c) Bronze Star - 36.
- (d) Air Medal - 15.
- (e) Army Commendation Medal - 52.

FOR OTUT  
691241  
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(f) Purple Heart - 8.

(4) This headquarters was engaged in normal operations during the reporting period. Emphasis was placed on the improvement of perimeter defenses and the performance of sentinels.

(5) On 6-7 November 1968, HNB, II FFORCEV Artillery achieved a satisfactory rating on a II FFORCEV AGI.

(6) There were no administrative or tactical moves by this headquarters during the reporting period.

(7) Current organizational structure of II FFORCEV Artillery is at Inclosure 1.

b. Operations

(1) General. This reporting period was characterized by the repositioning of Force Artillery units commensurate with the conduct of increased spoiling operations and the more aggressive efforts to seek out the enemy. A significant redistribution of Force Artillery assets was required to provide support for the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division. Force Artillery capabilities were taxed appreciably by not only the support required by this added division but also the support necessitated by increased activity on the part of maneuver units already in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Continuing emphasis was placed on seeking new ways to improve the effectiveness of ARVN Artillery, particularly in the area of mobilization of artillery assets.

(2) Tactical deployments and missions of II FFORCEV Artillery Units. Current deployments of II FFORCEV Artillery units are listed in Inclosure 2. Heavy artillery coverage for III CTZ is portrayed graphically in Inclosure 3. The current tactical missions of Force Artillery units are outlined in Inclosure 4; however, individual unit missions have varied frequently during the reporting period. Inclosure 10 provides the coordinates of fire support bases and other geographical locations cited in this report.

(a) While the heavy artillery coverage remained unchanged, there was considerable activity involving the heavy batteries during the reporting period. At the close of the period, all heavy batteries were in the configuration of two 8 inch howitzers and two 175mm guns, with the exception of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, which has three 175mm guns and one 8 inch howitzer. This unit was reconfigured

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from four 175mm guns to provide the 8 inch capability needed to counter the rocket and mortar threat against the unit's Fire Support Base (FSB) at St. Barbara. At the close of the last reporting period the configuration of Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery at Tay Ninh had been three 175mm guns and one 8 inch howitzer, with the battery split into one 175mm platoon and a platoon of one 8 inch howitzer and one 175mm gun. This posture was assumed in readiness to deploy the 175mm platoon east of the Angel's Wing area in support of a 25th Infantry Division contingency plan, while retaining the capability of both type weapons at Tay Ninh. However, since the plan was not implemented, the battery was reconfigured to two 8 inch howitzers and two 175mm guns on 18 November. Several support missions were conducted by Force Artillery units requiring the deployment of heavy platoons. With only one exception, one-half of the battery deployed to support an operation, while one-half remained in position to continue normal support of the base area. The moves included: 8 inch platoon of Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery from Quan Loi to Loc Ninh in support of the 1st Cavalry Division; 8 inch platoon of Battery A, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery from Bien Hoa to FSB Julia in support of the 1st Australian Task Force; one 8 inch platoon of Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery from Tay Ninh to FSB Washington in support of the 25th Infantry Division; one 8 inch howitzer of Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery from Ben Luc to Nha Be in support of US Naval operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone.

(b) In November 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division was deployed from the XIV Corps to III CTZ and assumed responsibility for the northern tier of the corps zone. The organic artillery which accompanied the division consisted of three 105mm howitzer battalions, one AKA battalion, and one 155mm howitzer battalion. The arrival of the division artillery significantly augmented the available firepower in the northern part of III CTZ. However, the increased support required of Force Artillery necessitated a substantial redistribution of Force Artillery Units. At the close of the last reporting period, the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105mm), less two platoons deployed in Northern Tay Ninh province was supporting CMAC. On arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division, the remainder of the battalion was repositioned to this division's Tactical Area of Responsibility. Battery C reconfigured, deploying three tubes at Katum and three at Thien Ngan. Battery B was positioned at Quan Loi and Battery A positioned three tubes at Phuoc Vinh and three tubes at FSB Dot. Battery F, 16th Artillery (155mm) deployed from Phuoc Vinh to Tong Le Chon to provide medium support for division operations near the Cambodian border. Battery A, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery relocated from FSB Thunder II to FSB Thunder III to provide medium support to both the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st

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Cavalry Division. The 1st Cavalry Division immediately began operations in the northern areas, and throughout the period Force Artillery units were heavily engaged with the enemy in these areas.

(c) On 3 November 1968, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery deployed from Nui Dat to YS 615 816 to continue support of the Australian Task Force. The operation continued for three weeks, after which the battery returned to Nui Dat.

(d) On 3 November, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery deployed from FSB Concord to YT 545 060 to provide medium artillery support to the 18th ARVN Division. To replace the medium capability at FSB Concord, Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery was repositioned from Tay Ninh to FSB Concord. When the ARVN operation concluded on 10 November, the battery deployed further east to YT 707 022 to support an operation of the RVN Marines. This operation lasted until 23 November, at which time the battery returned to FSB Concord. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery then displaced from FSB Concord to FSB Mead and assumed the mission of general support, reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

(e) On 7 November, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from Tay Ninh to FSB Crocket II to provide artillery coverage for the Phu Cuong Bridge.

(f) At the close of the last reporting period, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery was positioned at Di An in the 1st Infantry Division Tactical Area of Responsibility. On 13 November, the unit deployed to FSB Copperhead in the CMAC area. This repositioning was made possible when the 1st Cavalry Division assumed responsibility for the northern portion of the III CTZ, releasing a medium battery of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery for deployment to Di An.

(g) Battery B, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from FSB Patton II to Dau Tieng on 13 November with no change in mission. The battery remained in this location for over three weeks before deploying to FSB Bragg II on 10 December. While at this location in a general support reinforcing role to the 25th Infantry Division Artillery, the unit received several stand-off attacks by rockets and mortars. On 19 January at this location, the battery received a major attack in which one howitzer was a combat loss and two personnel were killed in action.

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(h) On 20 November a three gun platoon from Battery A, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery was deployed from Phuoc Vinh to FSB Dot near the Fishhook area and remained at that location throughout the reporting period. The proximity to the Cambodian border resulted in frequent enemy mortar and rocket attacks, with the intensity of enemy action requiring frequent rotation of personnel at this site.

(i) A combined operation in the eastern III CTZ was conducted in December 1968. Participating units included elements from the Australian Task Force, RVN, RVN Marines, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. To support this operation II FFORCEV Artillery provided a medium battery and one 8 inch platoon. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery displaced from Nui Dat to FSB Chestnut, while a platoon of Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery moved from Bien Hoa to FSB Chestnut on 3 December.

(j) At the conclusion of the combined operation a sizable enemy threat to the Bearcat area materialized. The 8 inch platoon of Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery was therefore displaced from FSB Chestnut to the Bearcat area, and Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery was repositioned from FSB Chestnut to the southeastern edge of Long Binh Post. The latter position provided medium artillery coverage to both the Bearcat and the Bien Hoa/Long Binh areas. Additionally, three searchlights, four Vulcans and two additional M42 Dusters were deployed to the Bearcat area.

(k) An 8 inch platoon of Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery returned to the vicinity of FSB Chestnut to provide heavy artillery coverage for a two week Australian operation on 21 December.

(l) On 5 January Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery displaced from Bien Hoa to FSB Julia with the mission of general support reinforcing the Australian Task Force. The unit remained in this area throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

(3) Artillery in support of the Capital Military Assistance Command. Due to the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division and the increased enemy threat in the northern III CTZ, it was necessary to reduce the fire support provided CMAC by Force Artillery by deploying the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery to the 1st Cavalry Division TACOR. The units remaining in support of CMAC include: Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm) at Nha Be; Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155mm) and Battery C, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery (155mm) at

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FSB Copperhead. In addition, a light battery from the 1st Infantry Division Artillery assumed the mission of the Force Artillery battery removed from Cat Lai. Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, although not within CMAC, provides general support reinforcing fires to units OPCON CMAC.

(4) Artillery Support for the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC). BHTAC, a parallel ARVN/US command formed to coordinate the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, became operational in early November. Force Artillery normally provides one heavy battery, one light battery and one medium battery immediately responsive to BHTAC. These units presently include Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery at Bien Hoa; Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery at FSB Concord; and Battery C, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery at FSB Concord. At the close of the period, BHTAC artillery assets had been augmented by the positioning of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery at Long Binh Post. Additionally, Force Artillery maintains one medium artillery unit at Bearcat, currently Battery A, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery, which can provide medium coverage for the southeastern BHTAC area.

(5) Artillery Support for SF/CIDG.

(a) On 3 November a platoon (2 tubes) of Battery B, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery was air-lifted to the Bunard Special Forces/CIDG camp to support a Mobile Strike Force operation. The unit remained at this location for more than a month and then returned to Bearcat.

(b) In response to a request for medium artillery support for a Mobile Strike Force operation in northwestern Tay Ninh province, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery on 30 November deployed one platoon (2 tubes) from FSB Copperhead in the CMAC area to Thien Ngan for a seven day period.

(c) Centurion III, a Mobile Strike Force operation, was initiated on 19 December. Due to the large area covered by the operation, the artillery support provided by II FFORCEV Artillery was implemented in two phases. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery was positioned at FSB Farrel from FSB Concord and continued support from that location until the maneuver unit was out of range. At this time the unit was returned to Concord and another unit was positioned at FSB Betty to continue support of the Mobile Strike Force. This unit was a provisional battery, Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, composed of three 105mm tubes from

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Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery and three 155mm tubes from Battery B, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery. The provisional battery supported this operation until 14 January 1969, at which time its two platoons returned to their parent batteries at Phu Loi.

(d) On 17 January 1969, Battery D, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (provisional battery) was reconstituted and deployed from Phu Loi to FSB Dottie to support operation Centurion IV, another Mobile Strike Force operation northeast of Centurion III and well into War Zone D. The unit remained in this area during the remainder of the reporting period.

(6) Split Batteries. Although the artillery has the capability of splitting batteries, this technique creates serious command, control and logistical problems, and its extensive use is therefore avoided if possible. During the reporting period, however, Force Artillery units were required to split batteries at an unprecedented rate in order to provide support for the many simultaneous operations being conducted in III CTZ. The total battery-days of split battery operations for the three months reached the exceptionally high figure of 1337 for artillery with II FFORCEV.

(7) ARVN Artillery. The preparation of ARVN units ultimately to assume the conduct of all military operations against VC/NVA forces has become a matter of increasing concern at this headquarters. Over the past three months close liaison has been maintained with CO, III Corps Artillery and with the US Artillery advisors. Frequent visits to ARVN artillery sites have been made by CC, II FFORCEV Artillery and members of his staff. The status of all aspects of ARVN's operations has been thoroughly analyzed, and ways to assist in the elimination of problem areas have been sought at every opportunity. In most areas, the artillery has significantly less problems than do the other elements of ARVN; however, in the most critical area of tactical mobility, the artillery has been severely limited. In fact, until five months ago all of the batteries in III CTZ were fragmented into widely dispersed two-gun platoons, immobilized in fixed sites, with the primary mission of GVN territorial defense. There was little unit integrity. Artillery headquarters, lacking flexibility and aggressiveness, exercised little or no control or coordination over the fires of these dispersed, immobile elements. As a result, the artillery could not and did not respond to the needs of the forces on the ground. Infantry maneuver units and Revolutionary Development (RD) forces were restricted to operating within areas where there was adequate artillery extant. In August 1968, the first steps were taken to mobilize the ARVN artillery when ten platoons were released from their territorial defense

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mission for employment on tactical maneuvers. For the first time ARVN maneuver elements could be supported with responsive organic artillery. This first critical step was accomplished with no degradation of the territorial defense coverage; however, in order to release additional platoons, gaps would be left in the coverage. Therefore, in November 1968, upon the request of CG, III CTZ, a plan was formulated by this headquarters calling for the assumption of the responsibility for territorial defense in these areas by US artillery units in II FFORCEV. In this second phase, ten additional platoons were mobilized. These, together with the first battery of a newly organized corps artillery 155mm howitzer battalion, brought to twenty-three the number of mobile artillery platoons in III CTZ ready to respond to the needs of the ground gaining and pacification units. Emphasis will now turn to monitoring the operations of these mobile elements, and providing assistance where required in the areas of tactical employment and training.

## (8) Employment of Improved Conventional Munitions.

(a) The expenditure rate of improved conventional munitions has increased considerably since the last reporting period, with over 1200 rounds being expended in the III CTZ during this period, as compared to 558 for the previous three months. This increase can be attributed to additional command interest, the increase in areas authorized for the expenditure of these munitions, and publication of a more detailed and less restrictive letter of instructions. The additional areas were derived from CG, II FFORCEV's granting authorization for OPCON units to employ improved conventional munitions in all areas previously authorized by CUSMACV. The letter of instructions permitted the division, separate brigade and group commanders to delegate the authority to expend these munitions to the supported or supporting battalion level.

(b) A system was established to maintain accurate data regarding the expenditure of ICM. This reporting system was necessary to provide the maneuver unit commanders information regarding areas that have been targeted with ICM and to provide CINCPAC detailed information on ICM effectiveness.

(c) A request was submitted to MACV to relax the rules of engagement for improved conventional munitions to provide for engagement of a wider variety of targets.

(9) Artillery Accidents and Incidents. Every round that leaves a tube in Vietnam is headed toward, by or over friendly troop positions

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and areas occupied by friendly civilians. There is simply no margin for error, yet errors are made and friendly personnel are killed and injured. These accidents and incidents continue to be a matter of grave concern for all artillerymen, and means to reduce the possibility of human errors are continually being sought. In November a new regulation governing the conduct of investigations of accidents and incidents was published. By providing for more thorough and analytical evaluation of the causes of these errors, it has enabled this and subordinate headquarters to make more thorough and timely assessments of areas requiring command emphasis and corrective action. The primary problem areas determined by these studies in the past quarter and corrective actions include:

(a) Coordination and control errors by echelons above battery.

Shortcomings in the system for controlling and coordinating fires were isolated early in this reporting period. A thorough evaluation of the operations of the FDC's and TCC's of battalion and higher headquarters resulted in significant improvements which have materially reduced errors by these agencies. In addition, the rules of engagement and TAC CCR's were revised in an effort to clarify and simplify all procedures for clearing fires.

(b) Firing battery errors.

Firing battery errors continue to result from the lack of experience of battery personnel and a failure to adhere to prescribed double check procedures. In order to provide commanders with an accurate and effective means of evaluating the professional competence and state of training of their personnel, a comprehensive Artillery Combat Readiness Evaluation Program was recently established. The results of these evaluations will be used to determine the need for personnel changes and areas in which battery personnel require additional training. In addition, increased command emphasis has been placed on adherence to double check procedures.

(c) Forward Observer errors.

The letter at Inclosure 5, written by a young officer serving as a forward observer in the 1st Infantry Division and recently distributed to all FO's and LNO's in this command, serves to point out the complexity of the job which the young officer is called upon to perform as an FO in Vietnam. In an effort to insure that he is as thoroughly prepared and qualified as possible before being sent to fulfill these responsibilities, every major headquarters has been encouraged to review and improve their procedures for selecting and training FO's.

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(d) Civilians in a properly cleared area. In an effort to reduce the number of accidents resulting from friendly civilians being in areas for which clearances had been properly obtained from GVN agencies, the following actions have been taken:

1. The problem has been brought to the attention of the office of DEFCORPS. Upon the request of CORDC personnel, sufficient copies of the II FFORCEV regulation governing rules of engagement, which had been translated into Vietnamese, were provided for distribution to all sector and subsector headquarters.

2. US artillery units have been instructed to establish liaison with local GVN clearance agencies for the purpose of obtaining friendly population overlays and insuring that these are continually updated. The units are required before firing to check target grids against these overlays in order to insure the validity of GVN clearances.

(10) MTCE Actions. During this reporting period, II FFORCEV Artillery conducted a thorough evaluation of the MTCE's of all corps artillery batteries and prepared appropriate MTCE's. Many of the changes, such as providing the batteries with a second FDC and duplicate sets of equipment in the firing battery headquarters, were necessitated by the increasingly frequent practice of splitting batteries. Other changes, such as providing the batteries with AN GRC 142 long range radios and increasing the skill level of the artillery mechanics at battery level were necessitated by the great distances over which the batteries and their service and support elements must operate. Changes were also submitted for the automatic weapons battalion and for the target acquisition battery, tailoring these units for the unique missions they must accomplish in Vietnam.

(11) Aviation Support. At the end of the previous reporting period, the aviation assets available to this headquarters and its assigned, attached, and CFCOM units included 2 MH-1B, 5 OH-6A, 3 OH-13, 1 U-6, and 6 O-1D assigned (a total of 17 aircraft, all part of the aviation section of the 23d Artillery Group) and daily mission allocations of 3 HU-1D and 6 O-1D aircraft from II FFORCEV assets. These assets were determined to be inadequate to meet the requirements for command and control (C and C), emergency organizational recovery, and Visual Reconnaissance (VR) for the many, widely dispersed units of this command. Through close liaison with the USARV aircraft allocation office, a program was developed which will provide II FFORCEV artillery units with additional aircraft on the following schedule:

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Jan 69 - 3 OH-6A helicopters have been delivered to the newly formed 54th Artillery Group Aviation Section.

Feb 69 - 3 additional OH-6A aircraft will be drawn by the 54th Group.

Mar-Sep - 8 OH-23's are scheduled for issue to the 23d Group and 6 to the 54th Group, as they become available through a retrofit program developed by the USAFV Aviation Section.

With these additional assets, the commanders and their staffs will be able to exercise more effective control over the operations of their units.

## (12) Programs to increase the accuracy of Artillery.

### (a) Metro.

1. During the reporting period the following metro stations were relocated in order to provide increased coverage and more frequent broadcasts in the areas of greatest artillery density. (At Inclosure 6 is a map depicting the metro coverage in III CTZ and a list of broadcast times for all stations):

1st Cav Div Arty - from I CTZ to III CTZ, assumed operations at Quan Loi.

8th TAB, 25th Arty - from Phuoc Vinh to Can Tho.

2. A recommended AGI has been submitted to the direct and general support activities to assist them in requisitioning and stocking repair parts necessary for support of the Ravinscnde systems. Obtaining critically needed expendable items, particularly radiosondes and calcium hydride charges, continues to be a problem. Close liaison with direct and general support agencies has resulted in the elimination of a number of errors in supply records which were contributing to this problem. The continued attention of this headquarters will be devoted to this area until a normal flow of these items is attained.

3. Because the parameters employed in evaluating the quality of the output of the various MET stations were revised in November, a statistical comparison of the quality of the output for this reporting period cannot be provided. It is the considered opinion of the MET

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Quality Control Team, however, that the validity of the MET outputs has improved during the past three months.

(b) Artillery Calibration. With the issue in mid-October of the M36 Radar Chronograph on a basis of one to each division artillery and two to each artillery group, the requirement for the coordination of the calibration support by the 177th Ordnance Detachment was significantly reduced; however, it was by no means eliminated. With the general support unit released from the primary responsibility of servicing the division and corps units, attention was turned to the US brigade size commands, ARVN and other Free world Military Assistance Forces, for which significantly improved service can now be offered. In addition, it has been found that because the very delicate M36 chronograph is difficult to maintain, continued support for division and corps artillery units is still necessary on a reduced scale. With the combined assets of the organic M36 radars and the continuing support of the 177th Ordnance Detachment, the calibration requirements of all artillery batteries in III CTZ can now be satisfied on a regularly scheduled, timely basis.

(c) Survey. The majority of the survey effort has been devoted to establishing survey control for ARVN and Free world Military Assistance Forces and surveying DEPTAKJ and perimeter defensive positions within the Long Binh/Plantation area. A total of 17 survey control points were established, the majority in the Long Binh/Bearcat area, and 13 stations in III CTZ were recovered. (At Inclosure 7 is map depicting 3d and 4th order Survey Control in III CTZ).

## c. Intelligence.

(1) Assumption of Intelligence Responsibilities by BHTAC. The formation of the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC) (see para 1b (4)) also had a significant effect on the intelligence program in the area of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex.

(a) On 5 November, immediately after it became operational, BHTAC relieved HQ, II FFORCEV Artillery of the responsibility for coordinating the operations of the flash base towers and plotting central for Long Binh Post. While the tower locations and units responsible for manning them remained unchanged, the plotting central was relocated to the BHTAC FSCE on Bien Hoa Air Base. In December, coverage to the west was increased by the addition to the flash base of a tenth tower.

(b) On 1 December 1968, BHTAC also assumed control of Operation Checkmate Charlie, a program which had been instituted by II FFORCEV

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Artillery on 6 February 1968 to provide aerial observation as well as command and control of supporting launches and artillery during night attacks on the Long Binh/Sien Hoa complex. Distribution BHTAC, on 12 January 1969, assumed responsibility for the daily VA missions which have been flown over this area by personnel of Headquarters, II FROCEV Artillery since 26 February 1968.

(2) Deactivation of the 67th Infantry Detachment. On 27 August 1968, Hq, II FROCEV Artillery submitted a request for deactivation of the 67th Infantry Detachment (GIR) and lateral transfer of the nineteen spaces to HNB, 8th TAB, 25th Artillery. These spaces were required to replace the personnel on 180 days TDY from COMUS who were manning two AN/TPS-25A radar sections in support of Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). The request was approved and on 4 January 1969, the 67th Infantry Detachment was released from its mission of supporting BHTAC and turned in its equipment (four AN/TPS-4 and two AN/TPS-33 radars). By 22 January, the personnel of the former detachment completed training on the AN/TPS-25A radars and relieved the TDY personnel at the two CMAC sites. Action is currently being taken by this headquarters to assist BHTAC in obtaining three AN/TPS-5 radars to replace the ground surveillance radars which they lost in this transaction.

(3) Identification of the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Projectile. During November 1968 the enemy began making greater use of the Chicom 75mm recoilless rifle as an indirect fire weapon. Due to the higher trajectory in this mode, the projectile is easily mistaken for that of the US 75mm pack howitzer. Furthermore, many characteristics of the two projectiles are similar and both weapons are available to the enemy. Since correct identification is essential to an accurate evaluation of the enemy's artillery employment, II FROCEV Artillery made distribution to all units of pictures of these projectiles and their fragments. (See photos at Inclosure 8).

(4) Surveillance of Intelligence Targets. On 6 December 1968, II FROCEV Artillery instituted a program to thoroughly analyze the validity of intelligence information and to improve the effectiveness of artillery fires on intelligence targets. The 23d and 54th Artillery Groups were directed by this headquarters to conduct, whenever possible, aerial surveillance of missions conducted on intelligence targets, with emphasis on conducting this surveillance as early in the morning and late in the evening as practicable. Results to date have not been conclusive because the majority of these targets are located under a thick jungle canopy, making accurate surveillance difficult. However, some reports of secondary explosions and damage assessments have been received and the program will be continued until conclusive results can be obtained.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS C-104 (U)

(5) Acquisition of Additional AN/MPQ-4A Radars. With the arrival in November 1968 of the 1st Cavalry Division, four AN/MPQ-4A radars were added to the countermortar surveillance assets in this area, bringing to thirty the number of sets in operation in III CTZ. Three of the four radars have been operating at Phuoc Vinh, Song Be, and Tong Le Chon; the fourth, which has occupied five different sites since its arrival, is presently located at fire support base CHANT, northeast of NUI BA LAM Mountain. During the months of December and January, these four radars experienced over 30% of the rocket/mortar attacks which occurred within range of countermortar sites in III CTZ. Of those occurring within range of these four sets, pickups were made on 25%. They have, therefore, provided a valuable addition to the countermortar coverage in III CTZ.

(6) Deception Techniques in the Employment of AN/MPQ-4A Radars.

(a) It was noted that with considerable consistency, mortar and rocket attacks were initiated while an AN/MPQ-4A radar was oriented in a direction other than that of the attack, suggesting that the enemy is aware of the limited sector of scan of the radar and plans his attacks from locations outside of this narrow sector. In order to deny him the knowledge of which direction the radars are scanning, a field expedient cover was designed to completely inclose the sets. This cover, which consists of a parachute draped over four uprights which extend above the top of the antenna, completely conceals the radar from view without any degradation of the radar's capability.

(b) Past experience has revealed that the presence of an AN/MPQ-4A radar acts as a deterrent to mortar attacks. A program has, therefore, been developed to establish a series of decoy and dummy sites. The decoy quite simply consists of the field expedient inclosure described in the previous paragraph. To date three dummy sets have been constructed at sites in Nha Be, Di An, and Long Binh Post. To insure the credibility of these deception devices, a program of rotation of dummy and actual sets has been initiated; in addition, most of the decoys are placed in positions which are on occasion occupied by radars.

(7) Analysis of Countermortar Radar (CMR) Effectiveness. In December 1968, a program to evaluate CMR effectiveness was initiated. The basic parameters considered were rocket/mortar attacks within range of radars, the status of the sets (operational or not), and radar pickups of these attacks. (NOTE: A separate program evaluates the effectiveness of the disposition of the radars by comparing the total number of rocket/mortar attacks to those which fall within range of AN/MPQ-4A's). The analysis provides a measure of the radar's capability to cover an

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area (the capability varying by the number of potential targets to be protected and the number of potential launch sites within the range fan), the operational capability of the individual sets, and operator efficiency. In December the effectiveness against the 172 attacks within radar range was 20.46, with the effectiveness of individual radars ranging from 0-100% (See Inclosure 9).

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Computation of Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) Fire Missions.

(a) Observation. Double checks to insure the accuracy of fires cannot be performed on data for 105mm and 155mm ICM fire missions computed by FADAC.

(b) Evaluation. Due to a change in the planned height of burst of ICM, programmed into the FADAC tapes but not yet changed in the Tabular Firing Tables (TFT's), these two sources of firing data produce different solutions. The Gunnery Department of the US Army Field Artillery School has informed this headquarters that the data provided by FADAC will produce optimum effect on the target, and that revised TFT's are in the process of preparation. While manual computations can be verified by a second independent computation using the same tables, those of FADAC, to be truly independent, must be checked either by manual computation or a second FADAC. Since few batteries have access to a second FADAC and data computation by and transmission from another FLC is too time consuming, the double check of FADAC data must be performed manually. Until the revised TFT's become available, this manual check cannot be accomplished for ICM missions, requiring that batteries employ the less effective TFT data.

(c) Recommendation. That publication and distribution of FT 105 ADD-B-2, FT 105 ADD-F-1, and FT 155 ADD-A-1 C6 to units in Vietnam be expedited.

(2) Erratic Debris Fallout Pattern of Illumination Rounds.

(a) Observation. The fallout pattern of debris from artillery illumination munitions is so widespread and erratic that it has been

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necessary to restrict the use of this source of vitally needed illumination in this combat theater.

(b) Evaluation. Debris from these rounds has landed in every direction around both the point of ejection and the predicted point of impact, with the carrier landing as far away as 600 meters beyond the predicted impact point. This seemingly innocuous munition is far from harmless as evidenced by the nine deaths and eleven injuries which have resulted from the impact of the debris of five illumination rounds over the past two months. As a result it has become necessary to restrict the use of these munitions.

(c) Recommendation. That an R&D program be initiated immediately to develop an artillery illumination round which either destructs its carrier and other impedimenta or deposits them in a small, predictable pattern.

## (3) Precautions in the Use of Artillery Fuzes.

(a) Observation. There is no guidance available upon which to base a determination as to which PD, SQ, or MTSQ artillery fuzes should be employed when firing during a heavy rain.

(b) Evaluation. For all PD, SQ, and MTSQ fuzes, TM 9-1300-203 includes the precaution that premature functioning may occur during heavy rainfall; however, no guidance is provided in this or any other document stating which fuze or fuzes are least sensitive to rain.

(c) Recommendation. That a study be conducted to determine the relative sensitivity of PD, SQ, and MTSQ artillery fuzes to heavy rainfall.

## c. Training Infantrymen in the Adjustment of Artillery Fires.

(1) Observation. Too often in the past, inexperienced infantrymen operating without an artillery observer have failed to call for needed artillery, have not been able to adjust fire, or worse, have brought fire in on their own troops.

(2) Evaluation. The infantryman, particularly the NCO and the junior officer, will often find himself operating without an artillery observer by his side, for in this environment of the widespread, small unit operation, there are simply not enough FO's to go around. These non-artillerymen must therefore be ready and able to call for and adjust their own artillery fire.

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(3) Recommendation. That the amount of training on the adjustment of artillery provided in the infantry schools be significantly increased.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Expedient Survey Technique.

(a) Observation. When the tactical situation and dense jungle vegetation preclude the use of normal survey methods, an acceptably accurate survey can be accomplished by simultaneously observing from three control points a helicopter hovering over a fire support base.

(b) Evaluation. Using this procedure, the following problems may be encountered: It is extremely difficult to observe a helicopter at ranges exceeding 12 kilometers; the maximum range for this type of survey is approximately 15 to 18 kilometers; and if the position at one control point is at ground level, it becomes necessary for the helicopter to fly at an altitude of from 1500 to 2000 feet to obtain a line of sight, with the pilot's ability to fly precisely over the desired ground location decreasing as the altitude of the helicopter increases. The accuracy of this survey procedure depends primarily upon the pilot's ability to remain on station over the proper point and on weather conditions, which can adversely affect aircraft stability and observation of the helicopter. Using the best three of five sightings from each position, an accuracy of 1:500 can be obtained by an experienced crew.

(c) Recommendation. That this method be used only when the tactical situation and/or the terrain preclude the use of normal methods of survey.

(2) Relative VR Capabilities of O-1D and OH-6A aircraft.

(a) Observation. The O-1D (Birdog) fixed wing, light observation aircraft is more effective for visual reconnaissance (VR) missions than is the OH-6A (Cayuse) light observation helicopter.

(b) Evaluation. While the OH-6A is a more versatile aircraft than is the O-1D, the latter is far superior for this one specialized, but very critical mission. The flying time of the O-1D is approximately four hours as compared to two hours, twenty-five minutes for the OH-6A. This permits the Birdog to range farther and remain on station longer, two highly desirable qualities in the VR aircraft. The O-1D has a wider field of vision, permitting both the pilot and observer to observe on either side of the aircraft. The O-1D provides a very steady observation platform, while the OH-6A vibrates to such an extent as to interfere

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with detailed observation of small or camouflaged targets. Finally, the ease of control of the O-1D permits the pilot to assist in observation, while the pilot of the OH-6A must devote his entire attention to the business of flying.

(c) Recommendation. That the current program of phasing out the O-1D as these aircraft are lost or become unrepairable be reevaluated.

## e. Logistics.

### (1) Use of Radar-repair Contact Teams.

(a) Observation. During several displacements of AN/MPQ-4A radar units, excessive non-operational time has resulted upon arrival at the new site.

(b) Evaluation. During displacements, AN/MPQ-4A radars are often subjected to excessive shock and vibrations, which can cause non-operational time. A radar-repair contact team standing by at the new site can render valuable assistance to the radar unit in attaining an operational status, in spite of equipment malfunctions sustained enroute. Experience during several displacements has shown that the radar-repair contact team, with experienced maintenance personnel, can assist in performing the necessary checks on the equipment to insure that the radar is rapidly returned to peak performance operation.

(c) Recommendation. That AN/MPQ-4A radar units request that assistance of a radar-repair contact team when displacing to a new location.

### (2) Reliability of Artillery Sights.

(a) Observation. Artillery sights are not sufficiently durable to stand up under the extreme climatic conditions in Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation. In the past four months, four artillery accidents resulting in the death of five friendly personnel and injury to twenty-six others were caused by defective sights. Of the four type sights used by artillery weapons in this theater, three, the M12A7H, M113 and M115, have each been involved in one or more accidents. In each case the cause of the malfunction was deterioration of the sight mechanism as a result of exposure to extreme climatic conditions. EIR's have been submitted on defective sights and all sights in this command now receive a monthly technical inspection by Ordnance personnel.

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
(c) Recommendation. That action on LIR's for artillery sights be expedited and methods for testing the durability of newly developed optical mechanisms be improved.

f. Organization. None.

g. Other. None.

10 Incl

1. Organization of II FFORCEV Artillery
2. Positioning of II FFORCEV Artillery
3. Heavy Artillery Coverage as of 31 January 1969
4. Missions of II FFORCEV Artillery Units
5. The Forward Observer of the Big Red One
6. Metro Coverage
7. Survey Control
8. Photos of 75mm Rounds
9. Countermortar Effectiveness Study
10. Alphabetical Listing of Sites

  
B.E. HUFFMAN JR.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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AVFBC-RE (15 Feb 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (U)


DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 2 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHEC(DST), APO 96375  
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery for  
the period ending 31 January 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
For O. B. FOXY  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVHOC-POST (15 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, HQ GPOH-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963751 3 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOH-DT,  
AFJ 04558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning Computation of Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) Fire Missions, page 15, paragraph 2b(1); concur. Through the Pin Point Distribution System this type publication will be automatically distributed. To expedite distribution an emergency requisition must be submitted by the unit and the publication will be air mailed to the unit.

b. (C) Reference item concerning erratic debris fallout pattern of illumination rounds, page 15, paragraph 2b(2); concur. Illumination fires must frequently be prohibited in populated areas or in vicinity of friendly troops. Malfunction Reports (AR 700-1300-8) submitted by using units are acted upon by appropriate DA agencies.

c. (C) Reference item concerning artillery fuzes, page 16, paragraph 2b(3); concur. Premature bursts, because of fuze sensitivity to heavy rain, are hazardous to firing crews, aircraft, and friendly personnel in the target area. Recommend action be taken by appropriate DA agencies when Malfunction Reports (AR 700-1300-8) are submitted by using units.

d. (C) Reference item concerning relative VR capabilities of C-119 and CH-6A Aircraft, page 17, paragraph 2d(2). Concur in recommendation that phase out of C-1 (Bird Dog) aircraft be reevaluated. The C-1 is capable of providing a more effective platform for visual reconnaissance artillery missions than the CH-6 (Jayuse). In addition to inherent stability, greater on station times, wider field of vision for crew members, and less pilot fatigue during sustained operations, the C-1 aircraft is better adapted for night operations during periods of minimal lighting and visual reference than the CH-6. The C-1 has the disadvantage of not being capable of landing anywhere a rotary wing aircraft can land.

e. (U) Reference item concerning Reliability of Artillery Sights, page 18, paragraph 2e(2); concur. The primary reasons for defective sights are: The recoil shock associated with constant firing at maximum charge,

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
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AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, HQ AFPC-45 (U)

extreme climatic conditions, and repeated displacement and emplacement required for slinging and hoisting. These problems are peculiar to the conflict in RVN, and WFOOM has been notified. The status of new sight development is unknown at this time. Prompt submission of FIR's will be continued as appropriate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy turn:  
II FFV Arty  
II FFV

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GROP-DT (15 Feb 69) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Fld Force Vietnam Army for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. L. SHORT,  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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## ORGANIZATION OF II FORCEV ARTILLERY

1. The following unit is assigned to II FORCEV Artillery: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery.

a. The following units are attached to 8th TAB, 25th Artillery and further attached or placed OPCON as indicated:

(1)	6th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)	OPCON CMAC
(2)	9th " " " "	OPCON BHTAC
(3)	75th " " " "	OPCON BHTAC
(4)	70th " " " "	OPCON CMAC
(5)	231st " " " "	OPCON CMAC
(6)	234th " " " "	Attached 23d Gp
(7)	246th " " " "	OPCON BHTAC
(8)	247th " " " "	OPCON CMAC
(9)	248th " " " "	OPCON BHTAC
(10)	249th " " " "	OPCON CMAC
(11)	257th " " " "	OPCON BHTAC
(12)	258th " " " "	Attached 25th Inf Div
(13)	259th " " " "	OPCON CMAC
(14)	260th " " " "	Attached 23 Gp

b. The following units are assigned to 8th TAB, 25th Artillery:

- (1) 1st Field Artillery Section (Surveillance Radar)  
(Provisional)
- (2) 2d Field Artillery Section (Surveillance Radar)  
(Provisional)

Inclosure 1  
ORGANIZATION

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2. Headquarters, II FFORCEV Artillery has operational control of two artillery groups. The artillery battalions listed below are assigned to the artillery groups indicated and are under operational control of II FFORCEV Artillery except as specified.

a. 23d Artillery Group.

- (1) 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (105T)
- (2) 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105T)
- (3) Battery F, 16th Artillery (155T)
- (4) 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery (155T)
- (5) 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (155SP)
- (6) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8"/175SP)
- (7) 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (8"/175 SP)

b. 54th Artillery Group

- (1) 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (105T)
- (2) 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (105T)  
(Attached 9th Inf Div, OPCON SA IV CTZ)
- (3) 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155SP)
- (4) 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155T)
- (5) 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (8"/175 SP)

3. Headquarters, II FFORCEV Artillery has one attached automatic weapons battalion, 5th Battalion (AW) (SP), 2d Artillery. This battalion has two additional batteries and one platoon attached as indicated below.

Battery D (MG), 71st Artillery

Battery I (SLT), 29th Artillery

Combat Evaluation Team (Vulcan)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>BASE CAMP LOCATION AS OF 31 October 1968</u>		<u>BASE CAMP LOCATION AS OF 31 January 1969</u>	
HNB, II FFORCEV Arty	Long Binh	YT 051 111	Long Binh	YT 051 111
HNB, 8th Bn (TAB), 25 Arty	Long Binh	YT 053 112	Long Binh	YT 053 112
HNB, 23d Artillery Group	Phu Loi	XT 847 152	Phu Loi	XT 847 152
2d Bn, 13th Arty (105T)	Phu Loi	XT 847 152	Phu Loi	XT 247 152
Btry A, 2d Bn, 13th Arty	No Base Camp		Phu Loi	XT 860 170
Btry B, 2d Bn, 13th Arty	No Base Camp		Crockett II	XT 746 162
Btry C, 2d Bn, 13th Arty	No Base Camp		Bragg II	XT 339 582
HNB, 3d Bn, 197th Arty (155T)	Phu Loi	XT 885 169	Phu Loi	XT 885 169
Btry A, 3d Bn, 197th Arty	Thunder II	XT 784 555	Thunder II	XT 784 555
Btry B, 3d Bn, 197th Arty	Phu Loi	XT 840 150	Phu Loi	XT 840 150
Btry C, 3d Bn, 197th Arty	Di An	XT 912 070	Di An	XT 912 070
HNB, 1st Bn, 27th Arty (155SP)	Dau Tieng	XT 498 468	Dau Tieng	XT 498 468
Btry A, 1st Bn, 27th Arty	Dau Tieng	XT 498 468	Dau Tieng	XT 498 468
Btry B, 1st Bn, 27th Arty	Tay Ninh	XT 143 525	Rawlins III	XT 306 521
Btry C, 1st Bn, 27th Arty	Cu Chi	XT 660 150	Concord	YT 034 174
Btry F, 16th Arty (155T)	Phuoc Vinh	XT 970 494	Tong Le Chon	XT 625 810
HNB, 6th Bn, 27th Arty (8"/175)	Quan Loi	XT 809 903	Quan Loi	XT 809 903
Btry A, 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Quan Loi	XT 809 903	Quan Loi	XT 809 903
Btry B, 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Phuoc Binh	YU 144 073	Phuoc Binh	YU 144 073
Btry C, 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Phuoc Vinh	XT 907 496	Phuoc Vinh	XT 970 456
HNB, 6th Bn, 15th Arty (105T)	No Base Camp		Tay Ninh	XT 140 520
Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty	No Base Camp		Phuoc Vinh	XT 985 490
Btry B, 6th Bn, 15th Arty	No Base Camp		Thunder IV	XT 116 890
Btry C, 6th Bn, 15th Arty	No Base Camp		No Base Camp	
HNB, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8"/175)	Tay Ninh	XT 142 522	Tay Ninh	XT 142 522
Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty	French Fort	XT 275 682	French Fort	XT 275 682
Btry B, 2d Bn, 32d Arty	Tay Ninh	XT 160 524	Tay Ninh	XT 160 524
Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty	Dau Tieng	XT 496 486	Dau Tieng	XT 496 486

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HHB, 54th Artillery Group	Long Binh	YT 131 118	Long Binh	YT 131 118
Nha, 7th Bn, 9th Arty (105T)	Bearcat	YS 166 990	Bearcat	YS 166 990
Btry A, 7th Bn, 9th Arty	Xuan Loc	YT 473 087	Xuan Loc	YT 473 087
Btry B, 7th Bn, 9th Arty	Bien Hoa	YT 035 176	Nha Bn	XS 923 815
Btry C, 7th Bn, 9th Arty	Nha Bn	XS 923 815	Concord	YT 035 176
HHB, 5th Bn, 42d Arty (155T)	Bearcat	YT 176 001	Bearcat	YT 176 001
Btry A, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	Tan An	XS 558 642	Bearcat	YS 160 990
Btry B, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	Bearcat	YT 177 002	Can Giuoc	XS 825 711
Btry C, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	Can Giuoc	XS 825 711	Thu Thuan	XS 542 711
HHB, 2d Bn, 35th Arty (155SP)	Xuan Loc	YT 473 095	Xuan Loc	YT 473 095
Btry A, 2d Bn, 35th Arty	Nui Dat	YS 839 665	Long Binh	YT 094 093
Btry B, 2d Bn, 35th Arty	Ba Tien	XS 766 866	Julia	YS 225 812
Btry C, 2d Bn, 35th Arty	Concord	YT 033 174	Horseshoe Bend	XS 746 866
HHB, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8"/175)	Bien Hoa	YT 024 154	Bien Hoa	YT 024 154
Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty	Xuan Loc	YT 464 083	Xuan Loc	YT 464 083
Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty	Bien Hoa	YT 024 154	Ben Luc	XS 637 766
Btry C, 7th Bn, 8th Arty	Ben Luc	XS 637 766	Bien Hoa	YT 024 154
HHB, 5th Bn (AW), 2d Arty	Long Binh	YT 128 114	Long Binh	YT 128 114
Btry A, 5th Bn (AW), 2d Arty	Phu Loi	XT 847 153	Phu Loi	XT 847 153
Btry B, 5th Bn (AW), 2d Arty	Cu Chi	XT 650 170	Cu Chi	XT 650 170
Btry C, 5th Bn (AW), 2d Arty	Dong Tam	XS 417 439	Dong Tam	XS 417 439
Btry D, 5th Bn (AW), 2d Arty	Bearcat	YT 166 001	Bearcat	YT 166 001
Btry D (MG), 71st Arty	Long Binh	YT 128 114	Long Binh	YT 128 114
Btry I (SLT), 29th Arty	Long Binh	YT 128 114	Long Binh	YT 128 114
1st Platoon	Lai Khe	XT 782 309	Lai Khe	XT 782 309
2d Platoon	Long Binh	YT 128 114	Long Binh	YT 128 114
3d Platoon	Cu Chi	XT 675 146	Cu Chi	XT 675 146
Combat Evaluation Team (Vulcan)			Long Binh	YT 128 114

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## LOCATION OF II FORCEV ARTILLERY UNITS AT 2400, 31 JANUARY 1969

UNIT	LOCATION	COORDINATES
HQ 23D ARTY GP	Phu Loi	(XT 847 152)
HQ, 2d Bn, 13th Arty	Phu Loi	(XT 847 152)
Btry A, 2d Bn, 13th Arty 3 Tubes	Phu Loi	(XT 860 170)
3 Tubes	FSB Dottie	(YT 200 537)
Btry B, 2d Bn, 13th Arty	FSB Crockett	(XT 746 162)
Btry C, 2d Bn, 13th Arty	FSB Bragg II	(XT 339 582)
HQ, 6th Bn, 15th Arty	Tay Ninh	(YT 140 520)
Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty 3 Tubes	FSB Dot	(XT 560 860)
3 Tubes	Phuoc Vinh	(XT 985 490)
Btry B, 6th Bn, 15th Arty	FSB Thunder IV	(XT 763 852)
Btry C, 6th Bn, 15th Arty 3 Tubes	Thien Ngon	(XT 082 810)
3 Tubes	Katum	(XT 333 900)
HQ, 1st Bn, 27th Arty	Dau Tieng	(XT 491 473)
Btry A, 1st Bn, 27th Arty	Dau Tieng	(XT 491 473)
Btry B, 1st Bn, 27th Arty	FSB Rawlins III	(XT 296 458)
Btry C, 1st Bn, 27th Arty	FSB Concord	(YT 734 174)
HQ, 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Quan Loi	(XT 809 703)
Btry A, 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Quan Loi	(XT 811 903)
Btry B, 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Phuoc Binh	(YT 142 771)
Btry C, 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Phuoc Vinh	(XT 977 497)
HQ, 2d Bn, 32d Arty	Tay Ninh	(XT 165 515)
Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty	FSB St Barbara	(XT 274 620)
Btry B, 2d Bn, 32d Arty	Tay Ninh	(XT 165 515)
Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty	Dau Tieng	(YT 491 473)
HQ, 3rd Bn, 197th Arty	Phu Loi	(XT 885 169)
Btry A, 3rd Bn, 197th Arty	FSB Thunder III	(XT 768 655)
Btry B, 3rd Bn, 197th Arty 3 Tubes	Phu Loi	(XT 840 150)
3 Tubes	FSB Dottie	(YT 200 537)
Btry C, 3rd Bn, 197th Arty	FSB Copperhead	(XT 810 020)
Btry F, 16th Arty	Tong Le Chon	(XT 625 810)

Appendix 1 to  
Inclosure 2

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## LOCATION OF II FORCER ARTILLERY UNITS T 2400, 31 JANUARY 1969 (Cont)


UNIT	LOCATION	COORDINATES
HQ, 54th ARTY GP	Long Binh	(YT 131 118)
HQ, 7th Bn, 8th Arty	Bien Hoa	(YT 023 152)
Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty	Xuan Loc	(YT 464 793)
Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty	Ben Luc	(XS 637 766)
	3 Tubes	
	1 Tube(8")	
Btry C, 7th Bn, 8th Arty	Nha Bhe	(XS 921 815)
	Bien Hoa	(YT 023 155)
HQ, 7th Bn, 9th Arty	Bearcat	(YS 167 972)
Btry A, 7th Bn, 9th Arty	Xuan Loc	(YT 473 097)
Btry B, 7th Bn, 9th Arty	Nha Bhe	(XS 921 814)
Btry C, 7th Bn, 9th Arty	FSB Concord	(YT 034 174)
HQ, 2d Bn, 35th Arty	Xuan Loc	(YT 472 095)
Btry A, 2d Bn, 35th Arty	Long Binh	(YT 090 093)
Btry B, 2d Bn, 35th Arty	FSB Julia	(YS 225 812)
Btry C, 2d Bn, 35th Arty	FSB Horseshoe Bend	(XS 766 866)
HQ, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	Bearcat	(YS 160 990)
Btry A, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	Bearcat	(YS 160 990)
Btry B, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	Can Giuoc	(XS 825 711)
Btry C, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	Thu Thua	(XS 543 703)
HQ, 6th Bn, 77th Arty	Can Tho	(WS 836 106)
Btry A, 6th Bn, 77th Arty	Can Tho	(WS 836 106)
Btry B, 6th Bn, 77th Arty	Soc Trang	(S 029 630)
Btry C, 6th Bn, 77th Arty	Soc Trang	(VS 025 530)

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M.T.: The range capability circles shown are those of the 175mm Gun.

II FFORCEV III CTZ AREA OF OPERATIONS  
ARTILLERY COVERAGE



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INCLOSURE 3  
ARTY  
COVERAGE

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## MISSIONS OF II FFORCEV ARTILLERY UNITS

### 1. 23d Artillery Group - General Support II FFORCEV and III ARVN Corps.

- a. 2d Bn, 13th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (1) Btry A - 3 tubes GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery.  
3 tubes Direct Support Co A, 5th Special Forces.
  - (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery.
  - (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery.
- b. Btry F, 16th Arty - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery.
- c. 1st Bn, 27th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery.
  - (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV.
- d. 6th Bn, 27th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery.
  - (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery.
  - (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV.
- e. 2d Bn, 32d Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (2) Btry B - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV.
- f. 6th Bn, 15th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery.
  - (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery.
  - (3) Btry C - 3 tubes Direct Support 5th Special Forces.  
3 tubes GS II FFORCEV, POF to 5th Special Forces.
- g. 3d Bn, 197th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - (2) Btry B - 3 tubes GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery.  
3 tubes Direct Support Co A, 5th Special Forces.
  - (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV, OPCON Capital Military Assistance Command, less positioning authority.

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2. 54th Artillery Group - General Support II FFORCEV and III ARVN Corps.
- a. 7th Bn, 9th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
    - (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 18th ARVN Division Artillery.
    - (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 2d Bn, 40th Arty.
    - (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - b. 7th Bn, 8th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
    - (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 18th ARVN Division Artillery.
    - (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 2d Bn, 40th Arty.
    - (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV.
  - c. 2d Bn, 35th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
    - (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 7th Bn, 8th Arty.
    - (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 12th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery.
    - (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 2d Bn, 40th Arty.
  - d. 5th Bn, 42d Arty - General Support II FFORCEV.
    - (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force Artillery.
    - (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 9th Infantry Division Artillery.
    - (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 9th Infantry Division Artillery.
  - e. 6th Bn, 77th Arty - OPCON Senior Advisor IV CTZ.

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## THE FORWARD OBSERVER OF THE BIG RED ONE

1. The duty of the artillery forward observer is to provide artillery support for the maneuver unit to which he is assigned. This is a 24 hour a day responsibility, and it requires initiative, common sense, and the ability to keep a cool head when contact with the enemy is taking place.
2. We'll start with calling in the fire mission. Prior to calling in any artillery, the FO must know his own location. Two reasons, you can't give coordinates to the target if you don't know where you are, and you can't expect the artillery to fire for you if you can't give them your location. You have your tools to help you, a map, a compass, the pace count kept by the point element, and marching rounds, which will be discussed later. None of these are 100% accurate, but when used together, you can always figure your location within at least 200 meters if you maintain a constant check on all four. Suggestion: When you're in hilly terrain, Song Be for example, use a 1/50,000 map which shows up contour features well. When in flat terrain, such as Thu Duc, the 1/25,000 picto map can be very helpful in that it shows many more streams and small roads. Carry both maps and check one against the other.
3. Your own location, a distance and direction to the target, a quick polar plot, and you can read the grid of the target. The call for fire can be made using that grid and direction or by using a shift from one of your pre-planned targets or marching rounds. If you are not using marching rounds, the first round fired in contact will not be in the target area. Reason: 95% or more of the targets you engage will be within 200 meters of your position. For safety reasons, contact fire missions should start a minimum of 500 meters from friendly troops. If you slipped up and aren't sure of where you are, start it further out and be ready to make a bold shift.
4. The best place to put the initial round is over-line of the target so that you can simply drop the rounds in on the target. The only time you should do otherwise is when the initial round over-line will put your element on the gun target line. In this case, place the round over left or over right of the target. Most erratic rounds come from cold tubes on the first round. Once that initial round has fallen safely you can start to work it in. If you are on the G. T. line one thing you must be cautious of is large trees. A tree burst can injure your own troops and will probably be short of the enemy.
5. How close to bring in the artillery? If the target is 50 meters from you, and the nearest rounds 100 meters from you, and the enemy has any kind of cover, the rounds aren't going to do you much good. You must

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know where your most forward element is if you are not in it. In many cases the artillery is shut off prematurely by the infantry because of fragmentation falling out of the sky. It is your job to educate these people as to the risk involved in close artillery support, but also to the fact that falling fragments may hurt, but will not kill. Make sure they know to keep low. Depending on cover available, berms, rice paddy dykes, etc., 105 artillery rounds can be brought to within 50 meters of friendly troops with limited risk. The FO must remain cool headed, and he must know what he is doing.

6. What shell or fuse should be used? The situation will dictate what to use. Shell HE, Fuse Quick is used most often, but many of your contacts will be with Viet Cong in bunkers. A heavy volume of medium or heavy artillery with fuse delay is best for this situation. In the rare case that you catch the enemy in the open, at a safe distance, use fuse VT. VT is also good for sampans on a river. You will have many occasions to use the illumination round. Several things to keep in mind: one, wind, use a starting grid that will cause the light to float over the area to be illuminated; two, don't make shifts smaller than 300 meters, if you do the light will not appear to have moved at all; three, the light should burn out just before it touches the ground, the more wind the longer it will stay up. Keep in mind what the artillerymen has to offer and educate the infantry so that they will want to use artillery.

7. How much artillery to request? As a guide line, you don't have to have rounds on the target to increase the method of fire. Sniper fire from 3 AK-47's does not mean that there are only three VC or that they will remain in the same place. Air observers, for example, expend many rounds working over areas that are suspect VC locations. You can decrease the interval between impacts by upping the number of rounds fired at each correction. i. e. platoon three, four, or five. When contact is made, turn it on quickly, move it around, and vary rates of fire. When contact is broken move it out, reduce rate of fire and go to marching or blocking fires. Use it when you need it but don't waste it. Artillery ammo is expensive.

8. Within minutes after initial contact is made, an Air Observer will normally be on station. The AO can be of great help to the infantry. However, his effectiveness is greatly influenced by the FO's ability to explain the tactical situation on the ground. First, where are the friendly elements; second, where is the enemy, what is their estimated size, and how are they deployed i. e., in bunkers, trees, cane fields, in the open, etc. Locations are given with reference to smoke popped on the ground. Smoke on the flanks and in front of the friendlies is necessary. When

smoke is out, the FO gives locations using directions and distances from the smoke. Example: "Forward-most friendlies north of green smoke, yellow smoke marks our east and west flanks. VC in north-south tree line 100 meters off east flank. Receiving heavy automatic weapons fire from large house with orange roof at junction of tree line and stream". Mark your position constantly with smoke and inform the AO of any changes in location or tactical situation. Never give your location by saying "friendlies in back of yellow smoke" or receiving fire from left flank". The AO does not know which way you are facing. One thing to keep in mind, what happens on the ground is a responsibility of the infantry unit commander; therefore, even if the AO makes all of the corrections, it is still your fire mission, your responsibility.

9. Providing "timely and accurate" artillery fire can be greatly facilitated by a good prearranged fire plan whether in the night defensive position, in an ambush site, or on a sweep.

10. In the NDP defensive targets should be planned and fired in if permissible. When planning DEFTARS keep several things in mind. One, the gun target line, keep off of it; two, the likely avenues of approach to your NDP; three, "Charlie" doesn't always use likely avenues of approach, keep 1,400 mile coverage; and four, that you are well oriented as to where the DEFTARS are on the ground and that you know how they are numbered. A ground attack at night can be so sudden that you will never have time to look at your map or compass. The best way to number them is clockwise from the north.

11. DEFTARS for the ambush patrol should be placed so that they will function immediately as a blocking force and rear security. "Charlie" is well aware of what a DEFTAR is, and when fired in, it can easily be distinguished from H and I fire. Have sufficient (3 to 5) on-call HE DEFTARS 500 meters from your position; also, have on-call illumination targets. It is a good policy to fire in one or two DEFTARS to verify your location and to determine how the battery is shooting. Bring these in to 400 meters. When firing in DEFTARS for the ambush patrol try not to use more than 3 rounds and fire the rounds at varying intervals more than 15 minutes apart. You will usually not go on platoon or squad size ambush patrols. Send your recon sergeant or RTO, or, at a minimum, make sure the element leader is capable of relaying through you what he needs in the way of artillery support.

12. On a sweep, the use of marching rounds will provide you with the fastest artillery support in the event of contact, and also provide you with constant marking rounds to help you determine your location. Suggestions: one, fire one round every 05 or 10 minutes "At my command"; two, adjust

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the rounds along a cardinal direction so that you can follow the replot data. Be cautious of your rate of march and the distance between you and your lead element. As always, keep the GT line in mind. Pre-planned targets should be set up for all sweeps whether in no-fire zones or specified strike zones. Targets should be planned so that at no time will you be more than 1,000 meters from targets that will provide you with adequate coverage. Tubes should be laid on these targets on a do not load basis if your marching fires are check-fired or if you are in a no-fire zone.

13. You have an additional responsibility in the NDP. When you are under a mortar or rocket attack, you will be expected to get the counter fires started. A polar plot given to the artillery is usually sufficient since they have your location. You should be familiar enough with your position that you don't need a compass to give a direction, but never be without a compass. Once you get the initial fire mission called in, try to get an analysis on a crater. The chances are against your seeing the flash or hearing the thud from "Charlie's" mortar tube. The crater analysis may be your only means of getting a good direction. You can easily tell from which direction the rockets are coming.

14. The big point to remember is, always be ready to go. Get your fire plan in as soon as you can get the sweep route from the infantry S3 or your Battalion LNO. Don't wait until the company commander gives the route to the platoon leaders. Double check to make sure all the necessary information gets down to the firing battery. One important thing is your radio, without a radio you are just another IIB. Keep it dry, always have an extra battery, try to get an extra hand-set and use your long whip antenna. Keep one jump ahead at all times.

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


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II FFORCE V III CTZ AREA OF OPERATIONS  
ARTILLERY METRO  
COVERAGE

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INCLOSURE 6  
METRO  
COVERAGE



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
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UNIT	LOCATION	SCHEDULED NAO BROADCAST TIMES
1. 1st Inf Div Arty	Lai Khe	0400-0800-1400-2000
2. 9th Inf Div Arty	Donk Tum	0500-0800-1400-2000
3. 25th Inf Div Arty	Cu Chi	0400-1200-1800-2400
4. 1st Bn, 27th Arty	Dau Tieng	0400-1000-1600-2200
5. 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Phuoc Binh	0300-0900-1500-2100
6. 7th Bn, 8th Arty	dien Hon	0400-1000-1600-2200
7. 3rd Bn, 197th Arty	Phuoc Vinh	0630-1030-1630-2230
8. 8th Bn, 25th Arty	Tan An	0630-1030-1630-2230
9. 2d Bn, 32nd Arty	Tay Ninh	0630-0630-1230-1830
10. 2d Bn, 35th Arty	Xuan Loc	0515-1115-1715-2315
11. 5th Bn, 42nd Arty	Nui Dat	0300-0900-1500- 1000
12. 8th Bn, 25th Arty	Can Tho	0400-1000-1600-2200
13. 1st Cav Div Arty (AM)	Quan Loi	0400-1000-1600-2200

Computer Metro broadcast times are 15 minutes prior to NAO broadcast times.



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- ▲ - 3rd Order Control established by 66th Topographic Engineer Co.
  - - 4th Order Control established by elements of the 1st ATF
  - - 4th Order control established by 8th Battalion 25th Artillery (TAB)



Inlosure 7

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U.S. 75mm Pack Howitzer Projectile


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
UNPACK NOW

UNPACK NOW

UNPACK NOW  
UNPACK NOW




U.S. 75mm Pack Howitzer Base Board  
with Three Types of Projectiles



0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

(INCHES  $\frac{1}{16}$ ) CMEC



Chicom 75mm AT Heat Projectile




75mm RECOILLESS RIFLE, HE  
CHICOM



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(C) C UNTERMORTAR KALAR EFFECTIVENESS (U)

MONTH OF DECEMBER 1968



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
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DOO 000 57000.10

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CURRENT MONTH EFFECTIVENESS (U)

MONTH OF DECEMBER 1968

UNIT/LOCATION  
 1/11 ARTY/BN TRZ  
 1/11 ARTY/LONG DINH  
 1/84 ARTY/BN TRE  
 1/84 ARTY/LONG DINH  
 2/4 ARTY/TAM TRU  
 2/4 ARTY/BN LUC  
 2/77 ARTY/DAU TIENG  
 7/11 ARTY/TAY NINH  
 1/8 ARTY/CU CHI  
 257 ARTY/758 MAHOML  
 257 ARTY/DUSTER  
 258 ARTY/TRUNG LAP  
 2/321 ARTY/THU LOI




— 1/1 — HIGH-OPERATIONAL  
 — 1/1 — OPERATIONAL  
 — 1/1 — NO ATTACKS  
 — 1/1 — NO PICK-UPS

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(C) COUNTERAIRCRAFT RADAR EFF. CAPABILITY (U)

MONTH OF DECEMBER 1968



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ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF SITES  
MENTIONED IN II FORCEV ARTILLERY ORILL

FSB - Fire Support Base  
SFC - Special Forces Camp

SITE

COORDINATES

Angel's Wing	XT 31 20
Bear Cat	YS 160 990
Ben Luc	XS 630 774
FSB Betty	YT 114 370
Bien Hoa	XT 985 105
FSB Bragg II	XT 339 582
Bunard (SFC)	YT 270 887
Cat Lai	XS 950 890
FSB Chestnut	YS 23 80
FSB Concord	YT 034 174
FSB Copperhead	XT 810 020
FSB Crockett II	XT 746 162
Dau Tiep	XT 491 473
Di An	XT 907 069
FSB Dot;	XT 560 860
FSB Dotjie	YT 200 537
FSB Farfel	YT 299 252
Fishhook Area	XT 58 90
FSB Grant	XT 370 630
FSB Julia	YS 224 814
Katum (SFC)	XT 433 902
Loc Ninh	XU 731 082
Long Binh Post	YT 05 10
FSB Meade	XT 604 112
Nha Be	XS 924 815
Nui Dat	YS 440 677
FSB Patton II	XT 582 195
Phu Cuong Bridge	XT 806 136
Phu Loi	XT 840 150
Phuoc Vinh	XT 985 490
Quan Loi	XT 811 903
Rung Sat Special Zone	XS 115 655
Song Be	YU 180 105
FSB St Barbara	XT 276 680
Tay Ninh (West)	XT 16 51
Thien Ngan (SFC)	XT 507 258
FSB Thunder II	XT 781 555
FSB Thunder III	XT 768 655
Tong Le Chon (SFC)	XT 628 810
FSB Washington	XT 145 568

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
Security Classification of this form of document and marking information must be entered when the control record is completed.		
1. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT (Separate entries)		2. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ, DACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310		SECRET
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 11 Field Force Vietnam Artillery		
4. DATES COVERED (Type of report and the date)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69.		
5. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (For example, distribution limited, for example)		
CG, 11 Field Force Vietnam Artillery		
6. REPORT DATE	7A. TOTAL NO OF PAGES	7B. NO OF SECT
15 February 1969	51	
8A. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	8B. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT	
1. SUBJECT NO	691241	
N/A	9. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. REPORTING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

DD FORM 1473

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Security Classification